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FOREWORD: THE MANY CONTEXTS
OF WELFARE REFORM
Jeffrey S. Lehman*
As this issue goes to press, Congress awaits a welfare reform
proposal from President Clinton. The details have not been
disclosed, but the leaders of the President's Welfare Reform
Task Force have indicated that they will propose a major
overhaul of the Aid to Families With Dependent Children
(AFDC) program. The draft legislation is expected to prohibit
a single parent from collecting AFDC benefits for more than
two years, and to invest at least $6 billion per year in efforts
to provide single parents with a more meaningful opportunity
to participate in the market economy.1
The nation is ready for another attempt at welfare reform.
On a superficial level, the timing coincides with what seems
to be a seven-year-cycle of legislative initiatives to reform
AFDC.2 More significantly, the end of the 1980s has left
Americans of all political stripes anxious about the relation-
ship among individual well-being, the private economy, and
the welfare state.
Consider first the economy. Before 1980, periods of econom-
ic growth tended to help the poor as well as the rich, by
reducing poverty without increasing inequality. The economic
expansion of the 1980s, however, was entirely different. It
coexisted with declining fortunes for the poor and the less-
skilled, rising poverty rates, and steadily increasing income
inequality.3 It was not just the economy-the 1980s also gave
us many reasons to worry that social progress had stalled, or
even reversed. America continued to be as racially segregated
* Professor of Law and Public Policy, University of Michigan Law School and
Institute of Public Policy Studies. A.B. 1977, Cornell University; M.P.P. 1981, J.D.
1981, University of Michigan.
1. See Jason DeParle, Clinton Welfare Planners Outline Big Goals Financed by
Big Saving, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1993, at Al, A26.
2. Over the past thirty years, the most significant amendments to AFDC were
made in 1988, 1981, 1974, and 1967. The Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-485, 102 Stat. 2343; The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-35, 95 Stat. 357; The Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88
Stat. 2337; The Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat.
821.
3. See UNEVEN TIDES 3-9 (Sheldon Danziger & Peter Gottschalk eds., 1993).
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as ever.4  More and more children faced the challenge of
growing up in a single-parent home.5 And some neighborhoods
were becoming lawless battlegrounds where concerns about
guns and drugs dominate the lives of ordinary citizens.6
Our welfare state is not to blame for these changes in
American society. v Nevertheless, the welfare state must adapt
to them. Moreover, current debate suggests that the process
of adaptation may begin once again with AFDC.8 The chal-
lenge for legislators will be to remember that AFDC is only
one element in a network of interdependent socioeconomic
structures.
To nourish the ongoing debate, the editors of the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform have drawn together
contributions from four law professors who have substantial
expertise concerning the American welfare state. All of the
Articles that compose this Symposium are animated by a
desire to broaden our frame of reference for evaluating welfare
reform. I believe that their shared project is important.
Efforts to change AFDC will send ripples through the multiple
legal structures that buoy our public systems of income
support and wealth redistribution.
In "Disentitling the Poor," Professors Susan Bennett and
Kathleen Sullivan situate welfare reform debates in the
context of "Section 1115 Waivers." The waiver system allows
states to continue receiving federal funds while their AFDC
programs deviate from the federal statutory model. During
the past four years, accelerated use of waivers has trans-
formed AFDC into a centrifuge of decentralized variation.
Professors Bennett and Sullivan draw on documents they
obtained under the Freedom of Information Act to expose a
potentially serious defect in the waiver system. In theory,
waivers could provide a rich source of new understanding
concerning the social consequences of different income support
regimes; in practice, many waivers are so badly designed that
they seem to reflect a spirit of brute stinginess rather than
4. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID (1993).
5. See, e.g., STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 103D CONG., 1ST SESS.,
OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS-1993 GREEN BOOK 1109-33 (Comm. Print 1993).
6. See, e.g., ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETwIsE (1990); ALEX KOTLOwrrz, THERE ARE No
CHILDREN HERE (1991).
7. See g., THEODORE R MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE
(1990).
8. The federal role in child support enforcement began in the context of AFDC,
but now extends beyond it.
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one of serious social inquiry. The authors attribute the
substantive problems to a procedural defect: the propensity of
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to
evaluate waiver applications through secretive, informal
procedures. They suggest that the process for reviewing
waiver applications should be fortified, perhaps through the
adoption of notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.
In "The Income Tax Treatment of Social Welfare Benefits,"
Professor Jonathan Barry Forman contemplates the point
where social welfare expenditure programs collide with the
federal income tax laws. Taxpayers traditionally have been
permitted to exclude governmental social welfare benefits from
their "income" calculations each April. Over the course of the
past decade, however, Congress has begun to abandon the
traditional practice, so that today all recipients of Unem-
ployment Insurance benefits, and some recipients of Social
Security benefits, must reflect at least a portion of their
benefits in their taxable incomes. Professor Forman first
provides a detailed overview of the complex universe of con-
temporary social welfare expenditures. After reviewing the
current structure of the federal tax laws, he then analyzes two
forces-academic reformism and deficit politics-that seem to
be driving the federal government to expand the taxation of
social welfare benefits.
Finally, in "Reforming Welfare Through Social Security,"
Professor Stephen Sugarman probes the membrane that
currently separates AFDC from Social Security. The United
States provides significantly disparate support to two groups
of children: (1) those whose fathers have either died or be-
come disabled, and (2) those whose fathers live elsewhere, but
are not disabled. A child in the former group may qualify for
relatively generous Social Security benefits; a child in the
latter group is relegated to the less generous, more heavily
stigmatized AFDC benefits. Professor Sugarman presents the
case for establishing a new Social Security beneficiary: the
child whose able-bodied absent parent has insured status
under the Social Security program. He suggests that the new
benefit could be financed in any of three ways: through an
increase in the general payroll tax rate, through recoupment
from noncustodial parents, or through some combination of the
two.
All three of these Articles invite us to reflect deeply on the
purposes underlying our legislative structures. They push us
SUMMER 1993] 733
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to contemplate the conflicting value commitments that are
embodied in our laws. They challenge us to think about why
things are the way they are, and how they might be otherwise.
In the remainder of this Foreword, I will pose some of the
questions about our welfare state that these Articles
stimulated for me.
Professors Bennett and Sullivan illuminate a problem that
sits at the intersection of several different strands of academic
commentary. For example, it might be tempting to under-
stand the waiver process as a delegation of control over wel-
fare policy to lower governmental units. In that light, the
waiver process can be seen as pro-democratic, pro-
participatory decentralization-as an example of what Cass
Sunstein has called "reconstitutive law"9 and what Europeans
call "subsidiarity."'1 Such a perspective might lead one to ask
why there should be any substantive HHS-level check on
waivers at all. Why should not HHS merely verify whether
the state-level processes were adequately open and participa-
tory? Perhaps the best answer is that, whatever the virtues
of subsidiarity in other contexts, it does not work in the
context of wealth redistribution. We have almost four
hundred years of historical experience with local free riding
and debates about welfare magnets." In a world where
worker and capital mobility is increasing rather than de-
creasing, it is difficult to endorse a romantic vision of welfare
localism.
And yet, one need not understand waivers only in that way.
As Bennett and Sullivan suggest, one might instead view
waivers as a form of controlled, national-level social
9. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 421, 506 (1987).
10. See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth Century Constitutions, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 519, 535 (1992); Antonio Lo Faro, EC Social Policy and 1993: The Dark
Side of European Integration?, 14 COMP. LAB. L.J. 1, 16-18 (1992).
11. The Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601 made income support a public
responsibility, but only at the local level. In 1662, the Law of Settlement and
Removal endorsed localities' subsequent practice of "warning off" migrants who
might become public charges. In modern America, debates about migration effects
continue because AFDC allows each state to establish its own level of benefits (even
without a Section 1115 waiver). For a concise overview of the history, see Harry
Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of Official
Efforts To Drive Homeless Persons from American Cities, 66 TUL. L. REV. 631, 635-46
(1992). For a concise overview of the empirical literature on "welfare magnets," see
Robert Moffitt, Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review, 30 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1, 31-36 (1992).
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experimentation-cautious and scientific efforts to learn "what
works" before we impose sweeping nationwide changes in
AFDC. 2 Such a perspective has worthy ancestors dating back
to the Progressive Era. Seen in that light, the HHS waiver
decisions look much more like a new breed of administrative
"policymaking by exception," which is precisely the sort of
behavior that might seem to call for notice-and-comment
rulemaking.
13
It is important to ask, however, what values the added for-
mality of such rulemaking would serve. Bennett and Sullivan
remind us that, as a general matter, the powerless tend to
distrust informal discretionary structures, but is it clear that
they would be more inclined to trust formal notice-and-com-
ment rulemaking? 4 To what extent do waivers really impli-
cate the concerns for dignity that we protect in the context of
individualized adjudication? 5 On the other hand, perhaps
other values should figure more directly in our thinking about
waivers. When there is no obvious need for secrecy, is it not
reasonable to expect that public authorities will reveal their
reasoning, at least after the fact? And even if it might not be
feasible for individual welfare recipients to participate in the
process, does not the process at least gain some additional
measure of legitimacy if organizations that can plausibly claim
to represent welfare recipients have an opportunity to partici-
pate? 6 Moving beyond procedural values to the instrumental
question of accuracy, do not Bennett and Sullivan make a
powerful case that the cause of good technocratic judgment
would be served if HHS systematically considered a more
comprehensive range of perspectives and information? 7
12. After all, the statute speaks of "experimental, pilot, or demonstration
project[s]." 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (1988).
13. See generally Peter H. Schuck, When the Exception Becomes the Rule: Regula-
tory Equity and the Formulation of Energy Policy Through an Exceptions Process, 1984
DUKE L.J. 163; Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE
L.J. 1487 (1983); Elise F. Lambrou, Comment, The Exceptions Process: The
Administrative Counterpart to a Court of Equity and the Dangers It Presents to the
Rulemaking Process, 30 EMORY L.J. 1135 (1981).
14. Cf. William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare
System, 92 YALE L.J. 1198 (1983) (discussing some of the dehumanization costs of
formalizing the adjudication of individual welfare entitlements).
15. See Jerry Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Adminis-
trative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of
Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976).
16. See Michael Herz, Parallel Universes: NEPA Lessons for the New Property,
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1668, 1708-09 (1993).
17. See id. at 1702-03 ("sensible, reasoned decision-making requires complete
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Even so, one wonders if there might not be a better way.
The experience with notice-and-comment rulemaking has
surely been a mixed bag at best.18 Do we want to impose the
delay and expense that have been associated with "informal
rulemaking" on the process for granting waivers for
demonstration projects? Do we need substantive judicial
review? Bennett and Sullivan recognize the value of well-run
demonstration projects. Perhaps there might be room for
small changes within the local culture of HHS that would
create a more satisfactory process and pattern of outcomes.
Perhaps one could design, from the ground up, a new waiver
process that is both efficient and participatory. 9
Professor Forman brings to light some of the tensions in tax
and redistributive policy that flow from the overlapping
economic heterogeneity of those who support and those who
benefit from the welfare state. Not only the poor enjoy gov-
ernment largesse. 20 Not only the rich pay taxes.2 ' At least in
theory, we might have created a single program that made net
transfers from net payors to net recipients. We did not.
Instead, it is usually thought that we tried to establish
independently coherent taxing and spending programs, in the
faith that the interactions among them will not prove too
incoherent.
So how should public benefits be treated under an "indepen-
dently coherent" income tax system? Like gifts from relatives
(excluded from income)22 or like money found in the street
(included)?23 How is using a Medicaid card different from
sending one's child to a public school, or borrowing a book
from a public library? Should it matter if the benefits are
means tested? Should it matter if the benefits cannot be sold
information and full consideration precisely because there are no standards to guide
the decision").
18. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts On "Deossifying" the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992).
19. See Marshall Breger, Defining Administrative Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
268,276-78 (1991) (reviewing PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE
JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (1989)) (discussing the "quiet revolution in adminis-
trative procedure" that has featured innovations such as negotiated rulemaking);
Jerry Mashaw, The Fear of Discretion in Government Procurement, 8 YALE J. ON REG.
511 (1991) (reviewing STEVEN KELMAN, PROCUREMENT AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: THE
FEAR OF DISCRETION AND THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE (1990)).
20. See NOT ONLY THE POOR (Robert E. Goodin & Julian Le Grand eds., 1987).
21. See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, WHO PAID THE TAXES, 1966-85? (1985).
22. See I.R.C. § 102(a) (1988).
23. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a) (as amended in 1993).
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and turned into cash? Ultimately, should our income tax
policy be more concerned with having the government share
in newly acquired individual economic power, or in newly
acquired individual economic well-being? Forman's study
connects our public spending programs to some of the most
difficult conundra of tax policy.24 And he notes the political
significance of the fact that most advocates of "comprehensive
income taxation" believe that an "ideal" income tax should
include social welfare benefits.
But Forman does not limit his discussion to the domain of
tax theory. He highlights the political salience of the current
budget deficit, and the extent to which it has caused politi-
cians to value changes in the tax laws that "expand the base."
More concretely, it appears that the 1990 budget summit
agreement has made it easier to finance new public benefits
spending programs by taxing the proceeds of existing
programs than it would be to finance those programs by
changing the marginal rate structure. In this discussion, I
believe that Forman highlights a central analytical problem
for students of welfare policy: if our political institutions
fashion effective "links" between two phenomena that are, in
theory, independent, how should those links affect our
analysis of prospective policy change?25 Do such links call into
question the notion advanced several paragraphs earlier, that
we can build a wealth redistribution system on the basis of
"independently coherent" components? To what extent do such
linkages undermine efforts to talk sensibly about the "ideal
structure" of our tax laws? And if such a discussion cannot
take place, is there another basis for constructive, critical
commentary about existing legal rules?
Professor Sugarman challenges us to envision a world in
which the child support obligation that we currently attribute
to an individual noncustodial parent is instead attributed, in
24. For a sampling of different attempts to get theoretical leverage on those
conundra, see William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86
HARV. L. REV. 309 (1972); Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal Deductions in the
Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343 (1989); Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions
Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in
a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831 (1979); Stanley A. Koppelman, Personal
Deductions Under an Ideal Income Tax, 43 TAX L. REV. 679 (1988).
25. Cf. Jeffrey S. Lehman, To Conceptualize, To Criticize, To Defend, To Improve:
UnderstandingAmerica's Welfare State, 101 YALE L.J. 685, 720-23 (1991) (discussing
the perceived linkage between the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Social Security
payroll tax).
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the first instance, to society at large. He forces us to ask why
a child's financial well-being is currently linked to the
financial capacity of an absent parent. But if, as he suggests,
we should move to a world where absent parents' financial
capacity does not control children's material standing, we
must then ask why we should perpetuate and extend the
Social Security system's practice of pegging benefits to the
absent parent's earnings history. Would it really be that much
more stigmatizing to adopt an egalitarian system that paid an
equal amount to each eligible child? Moreover, if our ultimate
concern is child poverty, why deny benefits to poor families
where both parents are present? In other words, why not
accept Sugarman's implicit invitation to move to a universal
children's allowance?
26
Other aspects of Sugarman's discussion raise a different set
of questions. If expanded Social Security benefits were re-
couped from absent parents, then his proposal would be little
different from Irwin Garfinkel's well-known Child Support
Assurance proposal. 27 But Sugarman seems more interested
in the possibility of financing the new benefits via broad-based
employee taxes. Why is it that the recent history of child
support enforcement has moved in the opposite direction,
demanding that absent biological fathers accept greater
"responsibility" for their children?
Apart from political considerations, is there any reason why
a child should have a greater claim on the assets of her
noncustodial, biological father than she does on an unrelated
man, or on the public at large? Is it Malthusianism-do we
worry that there will be too many children if they are seen as
a public and not a private responsibility? Is it a quid pro
quo-a price we exact in exchange for the opportunity (whether
or not exercised) to claim the parental prerogative to control
a child? Is it a sanction that we impose on account of the
father's causal role in having placed the child in a socially and
economically disadvantaged position? Sugarman challenges us
to consider whether, in a world where children would be
26. See ALFRED J. KAHN & SHEILA B. KAMERMAN, INCOME TRANSFERS FOR FAMILIS
WITH CHILDREN 200-14 (1983); Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn, Social Policy
and Children in the United States and Europe, in THE VULNERABLE 351-52 (John L.
Palmer et al. eds., 1988); Michael O'Higgins, The Allocation of Public Resources to
Children and the Elderly in OECD Countries, in THE VULNERABLE, supra at 201.
27. IRWIN GARFINKEL, ASSURING CHILD SUPPORT' AN EXTENSION OF SOCIAL SECURITY
(1992).
The Many Contexts of Welfare Reform
assured of at least a Social Security benefit, we might be
willing to socialize the risk of becoming a noncustodial
parent.28
To study the welfare state is, inevitably, to look inward. Our
public benefits programs are the concrete expression of how we
reconcile the tensions among our most basic public values. To
take a position on welfare reform is to take a position on the
kind of society in which we want to live.
This issue of the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform shows, however, that to study the welfare state is also
to look outward. Welfare policy inevitably implicates questions
of administrative policy, tax policy, and family policy. Anyone
who is trying to gain perspective on the current round of
welfare reform debates will benefit from careful study of the
informative and provocative commentary in the pages that
follow.
28. For earlier discussions of such a possibility, see David L. Chambers, The
Coming Curtailment of Compulsory Child Support, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1614 (1982);
Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility and the
Public Interest, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 367.
SUMMER 19931 739

